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Merleau-Ponty, Moral Perception, and Metaethical Internalism 
 Two of the most basic commitments of virtue ethics, both ancient and contempo-
rary, are that virtue is knowledge and that this knowledge is a kind of moral sensitivity 
that is best understood on the model of perception. On this account, the virtuous agent 
perceives moral goodness and badness in something like the way we perceive that a smil-
ing person is happy or that a raging bull is dangerous. This is opposed to the more widely 
held view of moral experience, according to which perception informs us only of non-
moral states of affairs; the specifically moral content of the experience, on this view, 
comes either from distinct pro- or con-attitudes toward those states of affairs or from 
general principles that we apply to them. One important advantage of the virtue ethical 
account is that it seems to be more faithful to our actual experience than its rival. If I wit-
ness my neighbors gratuitously causing severe pain to their cat, for example, I feel as if I 
perceive the wrongness of their doing so directly. I do not experience myself as conclud-
ing the wrongness by adding a moral principle—that it is wrong to cause pain gratuitous-
ly—to my perception of a morally neutral state of affairs. Nor does it seem that my con-
attitude is the source of the moral content of my experience; I would more naturally say 
the reverse, that I have a con-attitude because what I witnessed was morally bad. The 
virtue ethical account also seems to make better sense of how we frequently deal with 
moral disagreement: instead of trying to manipulate people’s feelings or reasoning with 
them from first principles, we often try to get them to recognize some feature of the situa-
tion as having a salience that we think they had not adequately perceived.  1
 But this account is also vulnerable to some potentially very serious objections. 
Two of these concern virtue ethics’ commitment to metaethical internalism, which is the 
view that sincere judgments of the form “x is right (or obligatory or called for by the cir-
cumstances of the case, etc.)” entail some kind of motivation to do x. It is the view, in 
other words, that motivation is internal to moral evaluation. One reason this view has 
been regarded as problematic is that it posits the existence of a Janus-faced mental state 
that is at once a belief and a desire.  According to the objection, there can be no such 2
mental state, since beliefs and desires have incompatible directions of fit: we modify our 
beliefs to fit the world, whereas we modify the world to fit our desires.  The second ob3 -
jection suggests that virtue ethics is unable to account for the fact that moral evaluation 
and motivation frequently do come apart: we see the moral importance, for example, of 
calling our senators to express our views about the rights of immigrants, but we don’t al-
ways feel motivated to actually make the call. If virtue really is knowledge, then it seems 
that this sort of thing ought not to happen. 
 My goal in this paper will be to show that we can find the resources to respond 
adequately to these objections in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Percep-
tion. In what follows, I will address the two objections in turn. In response to the first ob-
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jection, I will argue that motivation is internal to evaluation because the moral sense of a 
situation is given only as correlative to a particular manner of “gearing in” to that situa-
tion. To be geared in in the right way is to experience the situation itself as motivating an 
appropriate response. And in response to the second objection, I will argue that moral 
evaluation and motivation can come apart because we sometimes find ourselves in the 
grip of incompatible moral gestalts.  4
 Given that the problems I want to address stem from virtue ethics’ commitment to 
metaethical internalism, it will be best to begin directly with Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
motivation. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty characterizes motivation as 
a relationship in which “one phenomenon triggers another, not through some objective 
causality, such as the one linking together the events of nature, but rather through the 
sense it offers.”  Merleau-Ponty gives an example of this kind of relationship that is es5 -
pecially helpful for our examination of moral perception: for a journey to be motivated, it 
must have “its origin in certain given facts,” but in such a way that these facts are not un-
derstood as causing the journey. If someone were to seize me by force and transport me 
to a different location, for example, he would not motivate my journey; he would cause it. 
By contrast, a fact that could motivate a journey would be that a friend in another city has 
died. In this case, the motive “only acts through its sense:” I recognize the facts as calling 
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for me to attend the funeral, perhaps to “comfort a grieving family or to pay my ‘final 
respects.’”  6
 As I have described it so far, motivated action looks very much like action that is 
responsive to reasons. And this is indeed what Merleau-Ponty suggests: the relevant facts 
do not motivate because “they have the physical power to produce the journey, but inso-
far as they offer reasons for undertaking it.”  It is important to keep in mind, though, that 7
this equation of motivated action with reason-responsive action is potentially 
misleading.  To say that I act for a reason is at least to suggest that I explicitly posit some 8
consideration as counting in favor of some action. If something I want to purchase be-
comes available at a deep discount, for example, I might take that as a reason to make the 
purchase. But many cases of motivated action are not like this. If a person I am convers-
ing with is standing closer to me than I am comfortable with, I will feel motivated to 
move back. In most cases, I would not take the person’s proximity as a reason to move 
because I would not explicitly thematize the proximity at all. Rather, the person’s proxim-
ity is given to me directly as a solicitation to move back. 
 But how is this supposed to work? How can the sense of a situation be given di-
rectly as a motivation? If we cannot give an adequate account of this, then we will have 
some reason to adopt the more widely accepted view, which is that I perceive the sadness 
of my friend’s family and then bring the case under a moral principle that I am already 
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committed to, so that my motivation to make the journey comes from my commitment to 
the principle and not directly from my apprehension of the sense of the case. On Merleau-
Ponty’s account, the sense of a situation can be given as directly motivating because it is 
correlative to an orientation that is practical through and through. An example of this 
point can be seen in the apparently very simple case of perceiving a color correctly as 
blue. To do so, it is not enough merely to open my eyes and turn them toward the blue 
object. Rather, “a sensible that is about to be sensed poses to my body a sort of confused 
problem. I must find the attitude that will provide it with the means to become determi-
nate and to become blue; I must find the response to a poorly formulated question.”  The 9
blue, in other words, is not given most originarily as a fully determinate color, but rather 
as a solicitation to my body to orient itself toward it in the way necessary to make it ap-
pear determinately as blue. The same point also applies to perception on a larger scale: 
“for each object, just as for each painting in an art gallery, there is an optimal distance 
from which it asks to be seen—an orientation through which it presents more of 
itself….”  As in the case of color perception, the sense of the painting is given only as 10
correlative to the bodily orientation that it motivates. 
 In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes frequent use of the ex-
pression “gearing in” to describe what happens when we successfully adopt the orienta-
tion toward things that is necessary to bring out their sense. There are two features of gear 
mechanisms that seem especially relevant for the analogy that Merleau-Ponty is suggest-
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ing here. First, they can only do their work when the teeth of at least two cogwheels mesh 
together. In real gears, of course, the cogwheels are made for each other. And this is also 
true, at least to a certain extent, of the relationship between perceiver and perceived. I am 
able to respond appropriately to the solicitation of the nascently given blue because at a 
level prior to conscious reflection, my perceiving body “has already sided with the 
world” and “is already open to certain of its aspects and synchronized with them.”  We 11
should be careful, though, not to take this aspect of the analogy too literally. As Donald 
Landes helpfully points out in a footnote to his translation of Phenomenology of Percep-
tion, gearing in as Merleau-Ponty understands it is something that must be accomplished; 
the fit is not guaranteed in advance.  As a result, the process of gearing in can fail in a 12
way that it rarely does in the literal case. The second relevant feature of gear mechanisms 
is that one cogwheel transfers motion to another. Once I am geared into some aspect of 
the world, the world itself does much of the work of drawing me in, giving me an orienta-
tion and revealing further practical possibilities. This is what happens, for example, when 
I am geared into an improvisation with other musicians: I do not need to generate my part 
of the musical sense from scratch because the music itself helps to carry me forward. The 
same sort of thing happens when I am geared into a movie, a novel, a conversation, or a 
philosophy paper.  
Most importantly for present purposes, this is also what happens when I am 
geared into the moral sense of a situation. Let me illustrate the point with a relatively 
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mundane example: in the building where I teach most of my courses, there are three 
classrooms that are very difficult for students to find because they are not located where 
their room numbers suggest they should be. On the first day of each semester, I always 
see students anxiously searching for those classrooms, fearing that they will be dropped 
from their classes for non-attendance. Typically, this scene is gestalted for me in such a 
way that the students’ anxiety is in the foreground. When I am geared in in that way, the 
sense of the situation itself motivates me to help the students find their classrooms. Of 
course there is no guarantee that I will gear into the situation in that way: I might com-
pletely fail to notice the anxiety on the students’ faces, for example, or I might notice it 
but foreground something else instead, such as my own lateness for class. But if I am 
geared in in such a way that the students’ anxiety is foregrounded, then my motivation to 
help them is internal to my perception of the sense of the situation. The perception and 
the motivation, in other words, are not distinct mental states. This is possible, as we have 
seen, because perception-as is inseparable from gearing in, which is an irreducibly practi-
cal orientation toward the sense of the world. 
This, I hope, provides a satisfactory response to the first objection to the thesis 
that virtue is knowledge and that this knowledge is based on a kind of moral perception. 
But it does so in a way that seems to cut off the possibility of a satisfactory response to 
the second objection, which is simply that moral evaluation and motivation frequently do 
come apart. It would be hard to deny that we sometimes perceive states of affairs as call-
ing for particular responses, but without actually feeling the appropriate motivation, or at 
least without feeling it sufficiently. If it is true that moral perception is inseparable from a 
successful gearing in to the sense of a situation, then it seems that this should not happen. 
One way to get out of this difficulty would be to argue that if a person is not motivated by 
her perception of the moral sense of the situation, then she does not “really” perceive the 
sense at all. But this move is too easy, as it would make the virtue ethicist’s thesis true by 
definition. It would also make it difficult to understand how we could experience the gap 
between our sense of the situation and our motivation. Simply put, if we did not perceive 
the sense, then we would not perceive the gap. A second possible response would be to 
point out that we often lack the appropriate motivation simply because we are tired, ill, in 
great pain, depressed, distracted, etc.  This fact is compatible with the internalism, since 13
a reasonable construal of that view does not require that our motivations correspond to 
our evaluations in literally every case.  But this response does not take the problem seri14 -
ously enough. The real problem cases for internalism are those in which we lack the right 
motivations even when we are not suffering from these sorts of overpowering conditions. 
How can the Merleau-Pontian account of moral perception that I am arguing for here 
make sense of these sorts of failures? 
I believe the first clue toward solving this problem can be found in a distinction 
that Allan Gibbard makes in his book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings between accepting a 
norm and being in the grip of a norm.  This distinction helps to explain why participants 15
in Stanley Milgram’s famous experiment were willing to administer increasingly painful, 
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and even potentially lethal, shocks to subjects who answered questions incorrectly. Most 
of us who read about the experiment are very confident that we would not have continued 
to administer the shocks once we realized that we were causing great pain. And the rea-
son for our confidence is simple: we accept the norm of non-maleficence, which requires 
us not to inflict harm without good cause. But of course the experimental subjects accept-
ed this norm as well, as evidenced by the distress they felt when they obeyed the experi-
menter’s commands to administer the increasingly severe shocks. The reason the subjects 
administered the shocks was because in that very specific context they found themselves 
in the grip of a competing norm: to comply with the demands of the person in charge of 
the experiment. As outsiders reading about the experiment, we are not in the grip of that 
norm at all, and so it seems obvious to us that we would have acted on the norm of non-
maleficence. 
To apply Gibbard’s insight to the Merleau-Pontian account I am arguing for here, 
we could say that we sometimes find ourselves in the grip of competing moral gestalts. 
To be in the grip of a gestalt just is to be geared into the sense of a situation in a particular 
way. The close relation between Gibbard’s idea of being in the grip and Merleau-Ponty’s 
idea of gearing in is strongly suggested by the original French text of Phenomenology of 
Perception: two of the expressions that Landes translates as “geared into” are “en prise 
sur” and “en prise avec.”  One of the idiomatic senses of en prise is “in gear,” but la 16
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prise also has the sense of a hold or a grip.  A gestalted situation, then, has a grip on us 17
in something very roughly like the way a driver gear has a grip on a driven gear. 
In order for this idea to work as an account of how our moral perceptions can fail 
sufficiently to motivate, it must be possible for situations to be gestalted in more than one 
way. And this is exactly what Merleau-Ponty believes. When I see a cube drawn on a 
piece of paper, for example, I typically alternate between perceiving it “from above” and 
“from the side.” Even if I have drawn the cube myself and even if I am fully aware of its 
geometrical properties, which represent a kind of view from nowhere, I always see it 
from somewhere. And that “somewhere” is unstable.  Moral situations are frequently 18
ambiguous in just this way. Most of us gear into the moral sense of the situation present-
ed in the Milgram studies in a way that foregrounds the suffering of the subjects who re-
ceived the electric shocks; this way of perceiving would typically bring with it a strong 
motivation to reduce or prevent that suffering. But as the studies showed, the same situa-
tion can be gestalted in such a way that the suffering caused by administering the shocks 
is in the background, with respect for the authority of the experimenter taking its place in 
the foreground. When this gestalt switch happens, the participants do not all of a sudden 
become oblivious to the moral importance of others’ suffering. They still perceive that 
administering the shocks is morally problematic even when that aspect of the scene is no 
longer experienced as the most salient. They administer the shocks anyway because they 
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are in the grip of a gestalt that motivates compliance more than it motivates non-malefi-
cence. 
With this I hope to have presented at least the broad outlines of an adequate Mer-
leau-Pontian response to two of the most pressing objections to virtue ethics, and to the 
idea of moral perception in particular. Both of these objections called into question the 
kind of metaethical internalism that is required by the thesis that virtue is knowledge. If 
Merleau-Ponty is correct that the moral sense of a situation is correlative to a particular 
manner of gearing into it, and if he is correct that situations can be gestalted in more than 
one way, then we have good reason to believe that motivation can be internal to our eval-
uations. 
